Read this today, found it interesting, things are starting to get like they were with Russia er... USSR when I went on my first cruise in 79............... tensions are getting high again.............
Leader Spotlight: Gen. Frank Gorenc, Commander Of U.S. Air Forces In Europe
Leader Spotlight is a Q&A featuring luminaries of the aerospace & defense sector
The outgoing commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), Air Force Gen. Frank Gorenc, sat down with Aviation Week Pentagon Editor Lara Seligman in Fairford, England, during the Royal International Air Tattoo in July.
Q.: The European theater is getting its first F-35s at RAF Lakenheath in 2021. What advantages will the F-35 bring to the your area of operations?
Gorenc: The combination of fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft will be a huge advantage. For instance, if we go to a world where there's not an integrated air and missile defense [IAD] system or we can fly with impunity, we would probably use fourth-generation aircraft. But, if there's a possibility that we're going to end up in an area that's contested, then we would have to send our stealth aircraft to take down the IADs, gain [air] superiority, and then replace them with fourth-generation aircraft, because now they can fly with impunity.
It's going to give us so many options because of that capability, and so those aircraft--those fifth and fourth-generation aircraft, combined with remotely piloted aircraft in sufficient volume--depending on the scenario, we're going to be in good shape.
Q. Many of the U.S.' European allies, including Turkey, Italy and the Netherlands, will eventually get the F-35. How will the international F-35 program shape the U.S. relationship with these key allies?
Gorenc: I think that the F-35, given the number of Europeans that are getting that platform, is going to do for NATO what the F-16 did all those years back. The commonality of platform is really foundational to interoperability across the board. I really relish the day when all of those aircraft are in place, because air power is the asymmetric advantage of NATO right now, and in the future it's going to be even more capable because of what the F-35 brings.
The beauty of the F-35 is it's a multirole aircraft. I think that's an understated capability with the F-35, and so the potential of that airplane is just absolutely enormous.
Now, let's talk about organized training and equipping. The other advantage of all of these countries having all the same aircraft is that there's plenty of opportunities to make arrangements that will bring down the cost of sustaining the airplane: how we do it logistically; the systems that we use; the [information technology] that has to be developed along the way.
I think that in the end, because of the sheer volume of platforms that are out there, there will be opportunities to work with our allies and our partners who are flying that platform, when we have common interests, to exponentially increase the sortie-generation rate of the aircraft.
The other place where it's a real potential is that this aircraft, more than any other aircraft, counts on high-fidelity simulation with live virtual constructive. There are things that we will only be able to practice in the simulator, because none of the live ranges can accommodate all the capability. So, again, we're entering into a new era with this airplane.
I would argue we haven't really had an airplane like that before, and so it's going to require us to altogether change the way we think about sustainment; change the way we think about simulation; and change the way we think about deployment and employment. It's really an exciting time; I wish I was a captain.
Q. Speaking of interoperability, NATO expects to declare its first land-based Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability operational this year as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. What advantages will this joint capability bring to the region?
Gorenc: It is forcing us to think in different ways with respect to defense; design; preplanned responses; what we want; how we want our people to operate; what kind of rules of engagement there will be--these are all things that, given the speed of the threat, have to be done in a proactive way, not in a reactionary way.
So, I think it's forcing us into a little bit of a cultural change with respect to defense design, and it's all positive, because any future threat, I think, will be more like the ballistic-missile-defense threat than the traditional threat. I think it's making us expand our view of security. I think it's definitely making us think about both assurance and deterrence, and so, as a mission set, we're ready for it.
Q. What kind of signal does standing up Aegis Ashore installations now in Romania and later, Poland, send to our potential adversaries, particularly Russia?
Gorenc: The whole system was never intended to be specifically for Russia, but what I like about Romania and ballistic-missile defense is that it's recognition of the expanding threat. It's clearly defensive in nature--we have been very transparent about the physics of it, and how it works and those kinds of things, early on.
That's what it represents to me as an operational commander: We intend to defend ourselves; we intend to meet the aspiration of NATO; and clearly it's completely consistent with the ethos of, "We're going to defend the alliance," and so I think it's a reaffirmation of that.
I also think it's been a good process for the alliance to work on, and then, in the future, it will offer an opportunity for even more interoperability, even more dependence on each other to provide defense
Q. Are you concerned Russia or any other potential adversaries will see it as a threat?
Gorenc: I'm always concerned when anybody thinks that one of our efforts are specifically aimed at them, but I can't help the way that they interpret what we are doing. Just because they may have that perception doesn't negate the requirement to continue the effort. If they want to talk about it, we will talk about it. But the emerging threat is real. The emerging threat could be a game changer depending on how it's employed and what kind of warhead is on that missile.
Q. Is there a possibility that we will see additional Aegis Ashore sites in future years?
Gorenc: I welcome any of them, but as far as I know there's no plans after Poland. I think that decision will be answered with how things are going. If there's a proliferation of the threat or an escalation of capability--particularly with respect to nuclear weapons--then there may be a collective decision to invest in more, and so we will handle that when it comes.
Q. Recently we've seen Russia stationing submarines in the North Sea. Are you concerned that Russia could be trying to collect data from our aircraft that are training in the region?
Gorenc: I don't see that as any different than any other time. In the end, there's always a threat of people collecting on our sensors, but we have tactics, techniques, training procedures that we do to adequately safeguard our full capability. We always think about that. The increased presence of those subs doesn't particularly enhance any kind of change in that, it just reinforces the fact that people are interested in what we do, how we do it and what our capabilities are. So it's status quo in that area. Clearly, we have to make sure that we're prudent with and understand the trade-off between training and full-spectrum capability.
Q. Russia is also stationing anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles around Poland. How does that complicate NATO's ability to move around freely?
Gorenc: I think in the context of peacetime it's not an issue, but the fact of the matter is that the missile systems in Kaliningrad [Russia, and] the missile systems on the other side basically spill into NATO airspace every day. Every day, one-third of Poland's airspace is within reach of the IADs. It's the same for the Baltic countries. So, when things ratchet up, all of that is going to have to be taken into consideration with respect to the freedom of movement necessary to react if our nations choose to react, or if the alliance chooses to react.
What I don't want is the presence of that coverage to inhibit any kind of maneuvering that we want to do in order to protect our airspace.
Q. How do you prevent that?
Gorenc: I don't think you can. The fact of the matter is, it's there, and unfortunately the [2014 Malaysia Airlines Flight 17] shoot down in Ukraine demonstrates the potential of an incident. You don't have to go back into the future to figure out what the possibilities are.
I don't have any problems with them intercepting our airplanes, but when you do, you do it in a professional way just like we do--that's all we're asking for. So I think about the ground part, the surface-to-air missile systems, just like I do the air part, and being de-escalatory, being transparent, adhering to the procedures, executing in a professional way--that's what I think about.
Q. What do you when Russia doesn't play by those rules?
Gorenc: We make it clear that there's a process to express our displeasure when those few incidents happen--and, by the way, they are few. We just continue to reinforce the idea that we're flying in international airspace. We have every right to fly in international airspace; you have every right to intercept us--but let's be professional about it.
So, there's really no way I can shoot them away, but we can minimize the opportunity for some kind of miscalculation or unfortunate incident that takes us into places we don't want to go.
Cheers
Hoss